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Communicative knowledge 
pervasively influences sensorimotor 
computations
Anke Murillo Oosterwijk1,2, Miriam de Boer1, Arjen Stolk3, Frank Hartmann2, Ivan Toni1 & 
Lennart Verhagen  4
Referential pointing is a characteristically human behavior, which involves moving a finger through 
space to direct an addressee towards a desired mental state. Planning this type of action requires 
an interface between sensorimotor and conceptual abilities. A simple interface could supplement 
spatially-guided motor routines with communicative-ostensive cues. For instance, a pointing finger 
held still for an extended period of time could aid the addressee’s understanding, without altering the 
movement’s trajectory. A more complex interface would entail communicative knowledge penetrating 
the sensorimotor system and directly affecting pointing trajectories. We compare these two 
possibilities using motion analyses of referential pointing during multi-agent interactions. We observed 
that communicators produced ostensive cues that were sensitive to the communicative context. 
Crucially, we also observed pervasive adaptations to the pointing trajectories: they were tailored to 
the communicative context and to partner-specific information. These findings indicate that human 
referential pointing is planned and controlled on the basis of partner-specific knowledge, over and 
above the tagging of motor routines with ostensive cues.
Referential pointing actions can convey complex communicative intentions by means of motorically sim-
ple movements. Pointing directs the attention of an addressee to a remote referent by means of a proximate 
sign1, as when a diner points to an empty glass to request a new bottle of wine from the waiter. Planning such 
‘mind-oriented’ actions, i.e. actions that are designed to change the mental state of an addressee by virtue of being 
recognized as communicative2, requires at least two systems. On the one hand, it requires a communicative sys-
tem that specifies a behavioral vehicle suitable to convey the intended meaning to an addressee3, 4. This system 
relies, even for simple pointing, on conceptual information about the referential goal and the communicatively 
relevant characteristics of the addressee. Importantly, this information is not readily available in the environment, 
such as the knowledge that wine can be ordered from waiters, but not from cleaners5, 6. On the other hand, a 
sensorimotor system needs to guide the finger towards the referent object, similarly to ‘object-oriented’ actions 
that are designed to instrumentally change the physical environment7–9. Here we study the interface between the 
communicative and the sensorimotor systems by contrasting mind-oriented and object-oriented pointing move-
ments. These actions are experimentally tractable instances of the broader debate on the nature of the interface 
between conceptual knowledge and sensorimotor processes in communicative action planning10–15.
A number of studies have investigated the extent to which different actions, including pointing movements, 
are affected by a communicative intention16–23. The majority of the empirical evidence suggests that in interac-
tive settings communicators flexibly adapt their actions based on communicative demands and partner-specific 
knowledge5, 10, 17, 18, 21, 23–29. However, these observations raise two questions. Firstly, do these adaptations reflect 
general adjustments to social context (e.g. joint vs. solo actions30), social setting (e.g. left vs. right addressee18) and 
social relevance (e.g. eyes open vs. closed18, 22), or are they specifically tailored to the current triadic interaction 
elicited by the communicator, addressee, and referent23, 25? Secondly, how do such communicative adaptations 
interface with sensorimotor computations? To answer these questions, in the current study we aim to charac-
terize the temporal and functional nature of the interface between these computational systems. We do this by 
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quantifying the extent to which sensorimotor processes controlling movement kinematics are malleable to the 
triadic relationship between communicator, addressee and referent.
Human communicative and sensorimotor systems could operate in a modular fashion, in relative isolation 
from each other31, 32, or be pervasively integrated, allowing the systems to access each other’s internal computa-
tions33, 34. In a ‘modular framework’, where communicative knowledge is largely encapsulated from sensorimotor 
computations, pointing movements could be assembled from spatially-guided sensorimotor routines and osten-
sive communicative cues35, 36. These cues draw the attention of the addressee to the communicative status of the 
action because she recognizes the cues as instrumentally dysfunctional37–39, such as emphatically holding a finger 
in mid-air near the empty glass when ordering the new bottle. In favor of this view, recent studies have shown 
how increased communicative demand promotes a slower pointing movement with a prolonged hold time21, 22. 
However, it is also possible that conceptual information about the referential goal, the characteristics of the 
addressee, and the communicative context change the spatially-guided sensorimotor routines, i.e. the computa-
tions of the control parameters that lead to a particular pointing trajectory34, 40–42. Such a ‘pervasive integration 
framework’ is supported by recent evidence showing that the trajectories of instrumental actions are influenced 
by the social context and specifics of the addressee, including their task-relevance, location, and gaze43–46. These 
findings raise the question whether such adaptations are driven by stimulus factors akin to how object, distractor, 
and spatial context features guide goal-directed actions, or by conceptual knowledge that is part of the commu-
nicative intention and independent of sensory evidence.
In this study, we investigate the plausibility of the modular and pervasive interaction accounts of how com-
municative actions are planned. To this end we have developed a communicatively interactive game that involved 
a communicator, an addressee, and an onlooker, all centered around a communicative medium with signs and 
referents (Fig. 1). The study is focused on the mental processes of the communicator, as derived from analysis 
of the durations, the end-point locations, and the spatio-temporal dynamics of the communicator’s pointing 
movements. The experimental design manipulated three features of the triadic relationship between commu-
nicator, addressee, and referent that characterizes referential communicative actions47. First, we manipulated 
the action intention, contrasting referential pointing movements that conveyed information about the referent 
(‘mind-oriented movements’) against instrumental pointing movements that triggered the visual presentation 
of the referent (analogous to a button press, ‘object-oriented movements’). Importantly, we keep the visual cues, 
social cues and communicative context of the task stable (in all conditions the objective of the communicator 
was to transfer information to the addressee). Second, we manipulated the position of the addressee, by alternat-
ing the roles of the two participants on either side of the communicator (left and right) between addressee and 
onlooker. Third, we manipulated the capacity of three signs (located on the left, middle and right) to disambig-
uate between the available referents by exploiting well-established pragmatic inferences48. By isolating behavio-
ral markers of the referential pointing movements evoked in this dedicated task we assess how communicative 
knowledge influences movement execution.
Results
Thirteen triplets of participants (one communicator flanked on either side by an addressee and an onlooker) 
were asked to jointly open a vault. The vault-code, a sequence of multi-colored tokens (‘referents’), could be 
entered only by the addressee. However, the identity of each correct referent could be seen only by the com-
municator. The communicator could signal that knowledge to the addressee by pointing to one out of three 
single-colored tokens (‘signs’). The vault story was designed to clearly differentiate the instrumental nature of the 
object-oriented pointing movements from the communicative nature of the mind-oriented pointing movements 
(Fig. 1). Namely, in the object-oriented condition, the communicator’s pointing movement towards the signs 
was analyzed online by the vault’s computer system and the corresponding referent was automatically displayed 
to the addressee on a dedicated screen. In these trials, the addressee had to confirm this referent by selecting the 
identical token from the set of possibilities. In the mind-oriented condition, a broken wire prevented the vault’s 
computer system to display the referent to the addressee. In these trials, the addressee needed to infer the correct 
referent from the pointing movement of the communicator towards one of the signs. As such, the vault story used 
task-contingencies, rather than verbal instructions, to inform the participants of the instrumental demands of 
object-oriented pointing and of the communicative demands of mind-oriented pointing.
In the following sections, we report the effects of the three experimental manipulations [action (object-oriented, 
mind-oriented), addressee (left, right), and sign (left, middle, right)] on the duration of different phases of the 
pointing movements, the end-point locations of those movements, and the spatio-temporal dynamics of their 
trajectories.
Movement phases and parameters. There were several differences between the pointing movements 
evoked during mind-oriented and object-oriented trials. First, the reaction time of the communicator (the time 
before movement onset) was longer in the mind-oriented condition than in the object-oriented condition (2043 
vs. 1945 ms; F(1,12) = 12.14, p = 0.005, ηp
2  = 0.503; Fig. 2a; for further descriptive statistics see Table 1 and S1, 
available in the Supplemental material, for further statistical information see Table 2). The forward movement 
time (the time the finger was transported towards the sign) did not significantly differ between conditions. 
However, the holding time (the time the communicator’s finger was held still near the sign) was almost twice as 
long in the mind-oriented condition than in the object-oriented condition (426 vs. 225 ms; F(1,12) = 16.49, 
p = 0.002, ηp
2  = 0.579; Fig. 2b). This effect was strongest for the sign in the middle (left sign: 387 vs. 216 ms, middle 
sign: 460 vs. 227 ms, right sign: 432 vs. 231 ms; F(2,24) = 3.77, p = 0.038, ηp
2  = 0.239; Fig. 2b). The middle sign was 
most difficult to point out given that it was flanked by the two others. Lastly, the backward movement time (the 
time the hand was transported back to the starting position) was longer in the mind-oriented than in the 
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object-oriented condition (749 vs. 704 ms; F(1,12) = 12.89, p = 0.004, ηp
2  = 0.518). Critically, these main effects of 
the action’s communicative intent were not influenced by the position of the addressee. This observation suggests 
that modifications in the timing of the movements were used as ostensive cues, drawing attention to the commu-
nicative status and difficulty of the action but not necessarily tailoring the communicative message to the 
addressee.
In addition, we observed differences in the execution of pointing movements towards the different signs (on 
the backward movement time, the trajectory length, the relative time to peak-velocity, Tables 1 and 2; see the 
Supplemental Material for further discussion). These main effects of sign show that movements were not sym-
metrical around the central axis, but converged right of center (Fig. 3b). Importantly, the effects were not specific 
to any action or addressee condition (p > 0.168), suggesting they reflect biomechanical limitations on 
shoulder-joint rotations when using the right arm to point. Similarly, and probably for the same reason, there 
was a main effect of sign on the movement time of the addressee (the time in which the addressee selected the 
correct referent), with both the left and right addressee’s inference being slower when the sign on the left was 
pointed out (left sign: 1403, middle sign: 1355, right sign: 1322 ms; F(2,24) = 17.19, p < 0.001, ηp
2  = 0.589). 
Importantly, the addressee’s movement times and error rates were not significantly different between action 
conditions, an indication that the mind-oriented and object-oriented pointing actions were matched for their 
consequences on the addressee’s side.
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Figure 1. Experimental task. A schematic illustration of the experimental setup (a) and the trial interactions 
(b) in the object-oriented (top row) and mind-oriented (bottom row) action conditions. In this example 
the communicator plays the game with the right addressee, the left participant is the onlooker. Participants 
were asked to jointly open a vault. Only the addressee could enter the code (one of the referents), but only 
the communicator knew the correct code. To solve the game, the communicator needed to signal the correct 
referent to the addressee by pointing to one of the three signs, moving through a position-detection system. 
(a) The participants were informed that the vault’s computer system would analyse online the communicator’s 
pointing movement towards the signs and display the corresponding referent to the addressee (object-oriented 
trials). However, sometimes the display would not work (mind-oriented trials). On those trials, the addressee 
could infer the corresponding referent by means of the pointing movement of the communicator. (b) Left panels 
depict the sign selection phase (identical for object- and mind-oriented conditions) in which the communicator 
selects the sign that denotes the correct referent most clearly (the duration of this phase is the ‘reaction time 
communicator’). Right panels depict the pointing action towards the chosen sign. Subsequently, the addressee 
is either visually informed about the identity of the computer matched referent (object-oriented) after the 
movement had been completed, or infers the correct referent from the pointing movement itself (mind-
oriented).
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Pointing end locations. The analysis of the pointing end locations is focused on the horizontal-axis distri-
bution (see the Supplemental Material for a discussion of the depth, altitude and variability of end-points). There 
were two findings of interest. First, the movement end-points differentiated the three signs more clearly in the 
mind-oriented than in the object-oriented condition (Fig. 3a): the mind-oriented pointing movements towards 
the two outer signs fell more outward from the sign (left sign: 18.5 mm, right sign: 111.2 mm) than the corre-
sponding object-oriented movements (left sign: 20.2 mm, right sign: 108.0 mm; action x sign interaction, 
F(2,24) = 10.29, p = 0.001, ηp
2  = 0.462). Second, the end-points were shifted towards the location of the addressee: 
leftward when the communicator interacted with an addressee on the left (63,6 mm, collapsed over signs and 
actions), and rightward when the communicator interacted with an addressee on the right (64.6 mm; main effect 
of addressee, F(2,24) = 14.82, p = 0.002, ηp
2  = 0.553). Importantly, this effect was driven by the movements pro-
duced in the mind-oriented condition (Fig. 3a): the differences between end-point locations when pointing for 
the left and right addressee were larger in the mind-oriented condition (63.5 and 65.2 mm, for the left and right 
addressee respectively, collapsed over signs) than in the object oriented condition (63.6 and 64.1 mm; action x 
addressee interaction, F(1,12) = 6.69, p = 0.024, ηp
2  = 0.358). These two findings suggest that, during 
mind-oriented movements, the end-point location of a pointing movement is subtly adjusted to both the location 
of the addressee and to the spatial layout of potential referents. This indicates that the movement end-point incor-
porates communicative knowledge specific to the addressee and to the referential context.
Pointing trajectory dynamics. Similar to the end-point analysis, we focused the analysis of the trajectory 
dynamics on the lateralization along the horizontal axis, of which the absolute differences can be seen in Fig. 3b 
(see the Supplemental Material for a discussion of depth dynamics and trajectory variability). There were two 
findings of interest. First, the trajectories of mind-oriented pointing movements towards the left and right signs 
were shifted laterally with respect to the corresponding object-oriented pointing trajectories. This ‘mind-oriented 
lateral shift’ arose early during movement execution, already after 10% of movement duration, and it remained 
significant until completion of the pointing movement (p = 0.003, ηp
2  = 0.442; Fig. 3c). Second, the lateral trajec-
tory was also influenced by addressees’ location: whereas movement trajectories seemed to diverge away from the 
addressee in the initial and middle parts of the movements, at the end they converge in the direction of the 
addressee: leftward when the communicator interacted with an addressee on the left, and rightward when the 
communicator interacted with an addressee on the right. This addressee effect was statistically significant from 
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Figure 2. Reaction and holding times. Mind-oriented actions are represented by red bars and object-
oriented actions by blue bars. (a) Reaction time communicator: the time from stimulus presentation to the 
communicator initiating the pointing movement. *Indicates a significant main effect of action (p < 0.05). 
(b) Holding time: the time that the finger was held still within the proximity of the selected sign. *Indicates 
significant action main and action x sign interaction effects (p < 0.05). Error bars represent standard errors of 
the mean.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
5Scientific RepoRts | 7: 4268  | DOI:10.1038/s41598-017-04442-w
83% of movement duration onwards (p = 0.045, ηp
2  = 0.321; Fig. 3d). Analysis of the lateral derivative of the move-
ment (the directional velocity along the x-axis) confirmed that, towards the end of the pointing movements, 
mind-oriented trajectories were more strongly oriented towards the addressee than the object-oriented trajecto-
ries, from 75% until 99% of movement duration (the 100% point is not included due to the deceleration of the 
Action Mind-oriented Object-oriented
Addressee Left Right Left Right
Sign L M R L M R L M R L M R
RTc ms 2076 (108) 2047 (103) 2061 (115) 2023 (115) 2037 (96) 2015 (115) 2057 (106) 1915 (95) 1916 (105) 2009 (84) 1909 (91) 1866 (98)
MTf ms 908 (39) 900 (32) 885 (33) 875 (25) 870 (29) 871 (27) 855 (39) 876 (37) 836 (41) 864 (41) 845 (35) 860 (41)
HT ms 362 (94) 458 (114) 415 (95) 412 (107) 461 (110) 449 (112) 225 (77) 249 (82) 255 (83) 207 (72) 205 (72) 207 (68)
MTb ms 755 (37) 763 (33) 736 (34) 764 (26) 751 (34) 728 (32) 724 (31) 711 (30) 701 (36) 709 (26) 693 (29) 687 (28)
MTa ms 1413 (38) 1410 (60) 1333 (46) 1383 (80) 1349 (77) 1269 (82) 1450 (65) 1379 (59) 1395 (60) 1367 (74) 1283 (63) 1291 (76)
TL cm 39.7 (1.3) 41.6 (1.3) 44.3 (1.4) 39.2 (1.4) 41.3 (1.3) 44.3 (1.1) 40.9 (1.4) 41.7 (1.3) 44.4 (1.5) 40.0 (1.3) 41.8 (1.2) 44.7 (1.2)
PV cm/s 100.3 (6.3) 103.0 (5.1) 102.1 (4.1) 100.4 (7.3) 101.3 (5.1) 103.5 (4.8) 102.2 (5.9) 103.7 (6.6) 107.7 (6.) 103.3 (7.3) 104.0 (7.3) 103.9 (5.6)
rtPV % 16.9 (2.5) 13.0 (1.8) 17.8 (2.0) 15.8 (2.2) 16.2 (1.8) 18.8 (2.1) 16.7 (2.7) 15.5 (2.0) 18.8 (2.3) 16.8 (2.8) 16.2 (2.5) 21.9 (2.3)
EPx mm 17.8 (1.8) 62.5 (0.9) 110.4 (1.3) 19.1 (2.0) 64.4 (0.9) 112.1 (1.5) 20.0 (1.7) 63.0 (1.0) 107.8 (0.7) 20.4 (1.7) 63.7 (0.8) 108.2 (1.0)
EPy mm 15.4 (6.8) 33.1 (7.4) 52.9 (6.5) 12.5 (6.7) 35.4 (6.5) 52.3 (6.4) 19.4 (7.6) 37.1 (7.7) 52.7 (7.2) 17.4 (7.1) 37.7 (6.3) 52.3 (6.6)
EPz mm 23.5 (3.5) 30.5 (3.0) 35.6 (2.7) 23.4 (3.1) 31.7 (2.7) 34.7 (2.4) 27.3 (3.6) 34.4 (3.1) 37.1 (2.8) 25.5 (3.5) 34.1 (3.1) 37.4 (3.0)
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: mean and standard error of the mean for all conditions. The left, middle and 
right signs are abbreviated with L, M and R, respectively. RTc = reaction time communicator. MTf = forward 
movement time. HT = holding time. MTb = backward movement time. MTa = movement time addressee. 
TL = trajectory length forward movement. PV = peak velocity. rtPV = relative time to peak velocity. 
EPx = lateral end-point, horizontal x-axis. EPy = depth end-point, forward y-axis. EPz = altitude end-point, 
height z-axis.
Action (Ac) Addressee (Ad) Sign (Si) Ac × Ad Ac × Si Ad × Si Ac × Ad × Si
RTc 0.005* (12.14) 
ηp
2 : 0.503 0.179 (2.00) 0.105 (2.49) (F < 1)
0.072 (2.93)  
ηp
2 : 0.196 0.277 (1.35) (F < 1)
MTf 0.085 (3.61) 
ηp
2 : 0.231 0.197 (1.86) 0.322 (1.19) 0.107 (3.03) (F < 1)
0.051 (3.37)  
ηp
2 : 0.220 0.206 (1.69)
HT 0.002* (16.49) 
ηp
2 : 0.579 (F < 1)
0.006* (6.28)  
ηp
2 : 0.343
0.088 (3.46)  
ηp
2 : 0.224
0.038* (3.77)  
ηp
2 : 0.239 0.123 (2.29) (F < 1)
MTb 0.004* (12.89) 
ηp
2 : 0.518 0.138 (2.53)
 < 0.001* (14.21) 
 ηp
2 : 0.809 0.322 (1.02) 0.229 (1.57) 0.368 (1.04) (F < 1)
MTa (F < 1) (F < 1)  < 0.001* (17.19)  ηp
2 : 0.589 (F < 1)
0.078 (2.84)  
ηp
2 : 0.191 (F < 1) (F < 1)
TL (F < 1) (F < 1)  < 0.001* (99.14)  ηp
2 : 0.892 (F < 1) (F < 1) (F < 1) (F < 1)
PV (F < 1) (F < 1) (F < 1) (F < 1) (F < 1) (F < 1) (F < 1)
rtPV 0.114 (1.91) 0.008* (9.98) 
ηp
2 : 0.454
0.001* (10.02)  
ηp
2 : 0.455 (F < 1) (F < 1) 0.168 (1.92) (F < 1)
EPx 0.150 (2.36) 0.002* (14.82) 
ηp
2 : 0.553
 < 0.001* (1629.66)  
ηp
2 : 0.993
0.024* (6.69)  
ηp
2 : 0.358
0.001* (10.29) 
ηp
2 : 0.462 (F < 1) (F < 1)
EPy (F < 1) (F < 1)  < 0.001* (237.49) 
ηp
2 : 0.952 (F < 1) 0.112 (2.40) 0.197 (1.74) (F < 1)
EPz 0.088 (3.44)  
ηp
2 : 0.223 (F < 1)
 < 0.001* (56.57) ηp
2 : 
0.825 (F < 1) (F < 1) 0.329 (1.17) 0.156 (2.00)
Table 2. Statistics: the p-value, F-value and effect size of the observed results. Statistics are obtained from a 
univariate repeated-measures ANOVA with 1 degree of freedom (or 2 whenever sign is included as a factor) 
for the test and 12 degrees of freedom (or 24) for the error. F-values are reported between brackets. Only effects 
with an F-value larger than 1 are reported in full. Partial eta-squared is reported only for (marginally) significant 
effects. Significant effects (p < 0.05) are marked by*. All abbreviations and conventions as in Table 1.
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end-point; action x addressee interaction, p = 0.009, ηp
2  = 0.584; Fig. 3d). This observation shows that, during 
mind-oriented trials, communicators adjusted the direction of their pointing finger towards the location of the 
addressee. Together, these findings suggest that, in the presence of stronger communicative demands on the 
pointing movement itself, the whole pointing trajectory is subtly adjusted to the spatial location of the addressee 
and to the spatial layout of potential referent objects. This indicates that communicative knowledge specific to the 
addressee and referential context is incorporated into the trajectory already from an early stage.
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Figure 3. End point locations and lateral development of the trajectory dynamics. (a) Pointing end locations 
towards the left, middle and right signs projected on the horizontal-altitude plane, split for mind- and object 
oriented actions (red and blue, respectively) and left and right addressees (indicated by arrows). (b) Temporal 
development, relative to the forward movement time, of the horizontal displacement of pointing movements 
(the ‘lateral development’), split for left, middle and right signs, mind- and object oriented actions (red and 
blue, respectively) and left and right addressees (continuous lines and dashed lines, respectively). (c) The 
relative difference in the lateral development between mind-oriented and object-oriented pointing movements, 
split for the left, middle and right signs (green, blue, and red, respectively). *Indicates a significant action x 
sign interaction from 10–100% (p < 0.05, corrected). (d) The relative difference in the lateral development of 
mind-oriented and object-oriented pointing movements for the left and right addressee positions. *Indicates 
a significant addressee effect from 83–100% and an action x addressee interaction effect in direction (lateral 
velocity) from 75–99% (both p < 0.05, corrected). Variance clouds around the mean trajectories represent 
standard errors of the mean. The grey dashed lines at point 0 of the relative lateral deviation (in c and d) 
represent the baseline object-oriented movements to which the communicative counterparts are contrasted. See 
the Supplemental Material for the relative lateral deviation split for each combination of sign and addressee.
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Discussion
This study brings empirical evidence to the ongoing debate on how conceptual knowledge interfaces with sensori-
motor processes. We used motion analysis of referential pointing movements to understand the nature of the inter-
face between the conceptual communicative and the sensorimotor systems. We assessed whether communicative 
knowledge is simply appended to spatially-guided motor routines by means of communicative ostensive cues, or 
whether that knowledge is also able to access the sensorimotor system and influence the computations that control 
spatial movement dynamics. There are two main findings. First, the duration of events surrounding the pointing 
movements, like the time spent holding the hand near the sign, is influenced by the communicative intention, but 
remains indifferent to the addressee’s point of view. This finding indicates that ostensive cues produced for drawing 
attention to the communicative status of the action are largely insensitive to the specifics of the triadic relationship 
between communicator, addressee, and referent. Second, the communicative intention and the location of the 
addressee influenced the trajectory and the end-point location of the pointing finger. This finding provides evi-
dence for a pervasive interaction between communicative knowledge and sensorimotor computations.
Pointing with the intention to communicate directly to the addressee elicited a longer reaction time 
(before movement initiation), a prolonged holding time (the finger being held at the end-point) and a longer 
backward-movement time (from end-point to movement completion). The prolonged reaction time could reflect 
an increased cognitive load on the communicator. It could also reflect a conversational use of the turn-taking 
delay, similar to what is observed during spoken dialogue49. The prolonged holding time marks and enhances 
the opportunity for the addressee to accumulate sensory evidence about the spatial relation between the pointing 
finger and the signs. This interpretation is supported by the observation that the enhanced holding time was 
most pronounced towards the middle sign, i.e. the sign that was the hardest to distinguish from the others when 
pointing. These temporal adjustments fit a number of observations obtained across experimentally-controlled 
communicative interactions as well as naturalistic conversation, in which prolonged timing explicitly marks the 
communicatively relevant information21, 50, 51. Here we add to that literature by showing that these temporal osten-
sive cues can be adjusted to the estimated difficulty of successfully conveying a message but are not necessarily 
informed by addressee-specific knowledge.
During mind-oriented pointing, the end location of the index finger marked the relative target locations 
with a stronger spatial emphasis and varied with the position of the addressee. This shows that the communi-
cator considered the communicative context and the viewpoint of a particular addressee when planning the 
goal-state configuration of the arm joints in space. Previously, Cleret de Langavant and colleagues18 observed a 
tilted end-point variability when communicative pointing movements were directed towards an addressee on 
the left (but not on the right) of the communicator. In contrast, we find that movements are systematically and 
laterally displaced towards the addressee. This discrepancy could be related to differences in procedural details of 
the two experiments. In the study of Cleret de Langavant and colleagues, communicators ended their movement 
against a horizontal surface, whereas in this study communicators held their finger in mid-air. Furthermore, in 
their study, the effects of communicatively pointing towards a single object were compared to those evoked by a 
non-communicative control condition in which the addressee closed their eyes. In the current study, there were 
three equiprobable targets, and the effects concern differences between two communicatively relevant conditions. 
This suggests that the discrepancy between the study by Cleret de Langavant and colleagues and the current study 
could also be related to different demands in disambiguating the referents.
The lateral shifts revealed in the end-points of communicative trajectories can be interpreted as ostensive cues 
that are added to an independently programmed movement, or as consequences of the communicative inten-
tion directly influencing sensorimotor computations that specify how to reach the desired goal-state. The latter 
interpretation is supported by the differences in the whole movement trajectory: shortly after movement onset, 
mind-oriented pointing movements followed a different trajectory than object-oriented movements. Moreover, 
halfway through the action, communicators adjusted the direction of their movement according to the addressee’s 
viewpoint. This provides strong support for the idea that mind-oriented actions are planned as a function of the 
presumed understanding of a particular addressee.
Our findings are in line with previous observations on how instrumental reach-to-grasp movements are 
affected by characteristics of a particular observer43–46. Similarly, this study confirms the observation that lateral 
movement-shifts, arising late in movement trajectories, are driven by the location of a particular addressee18. 
Crucially, here we show that early effects in movement trajectories are not only affected by the presence of a 
communicative intention, but also by the array of possible referents. These findings reveal that communicative 
adjustments are more than exaggerations of an existing motor routine, as suggested by results from the existing 
literature (e.g. an elevated18, 30, 45 or slowly executed movement21, 22). We provide empirical evidence, for the first 
time, for the notion that communicative demands pervasively change a pointing movement, and we show how 
that movement is influenced by specific features of the triadic relationship between communicator, addressee and 
object both early and late in action planning.
It could be argued that the communicative relevance of the adjustments observed in the end-points and trajec-
tories of the pointing movements is undermined by the magnitude of those adjustments. Future research should 
consider whether those adjustments are used by the addressee when inferring a referent. However, the presence 
of consistent effects on the communicator’s behavior observed here is strong proof of the pervasive and automatic 
influence that communicative knowledge has on the communicator’s sensorimotor processes. The fact that those 
effects arise in a situation in which they seem communicatively unnecessary only reinforces this interpretation.
The manipulation of the communicator’s intention that is implemented in this study adds considerable speci-
ficity to the empirical findings. Namely, both experimental conditions (mind-oriented and object-oriented move-
ments) required the communicator to share his knowledge with the addressee by means of a pointing movement. 
The crucial manipulation pertains to the addressee’s requirement to infer the intended reference either directly 
from the movement or from its instrumental consequence. This subtle manipulation achieves two important 
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effects. First, it minimizes potential confounds arising from coarse between-conditions differences in motivation 
or social consequences of the actions, intrinsic in previous pointing studies that directly compare communica-
tive with non-communicative settings (e.g. pointing for a blindfolded addressee18, 22). Second, this manipula-
tion ensures that the kinematic adjustments do not arise from differences in attentional, perceptual or motoric 
demands between mind-oriented and object-oriented conditions52–54, since these two conditions were identical 
in terms of their perceptual input, required motor output, and interdependence between the communicator and 
the addressee.
In conclusion, we studied the interaction between communicative and sensorimotor systems during refer-
ential pointing movements and found evidence for a pervasive interaction between those two systems. Pointing 
trajectories and movement direction were affected by the communicative context and the addressee’s viewpoint, 
indicating that communicative knowledge has access to low-level sensorimotor computations. This observation 
opens the way for studying the computational and neural mechanisms that support this pervasive integration 
between conceptual knowledge and sensorimotor processes.
Methods
Participants. Eighteen right-handed participants were recruited (11 female, ages 17–29) and alternated in their 
role; fifteen played one session as communicator and one session as addressee/onlooker. The other three were 
assigned the role of addressee/onlooker twice. Two of the fifteen communicators were excluded from analysis 
because they did not comply with the task requirements (they talked during the experiment and were unable to solve 
the task consistently: > 30% of trials incorrect). We based our sample size a priori on the sample sizes (9 < n < 14) 
and observed effect sizes (ηp
2  ~ 0.5) of previously published studies investigating similar effects19, 22, 30, 55. For example, 
the partial eta-squared of the effect of communicative setting on maximum trajectory deviation observed by Sartori 
and colleagues22 was 0.43, resulting in a testing power (1 − β) > 0.99 with the n = 10 sample size. We used 
G * Power356 to estimate the required sample size for the current study based on a more conservative prospective 
effect size: for a repeated measures factorial ANOVA with an effect size of ηp
2  = 0.2, a sample size of n = 13 would 
result in a power (1 − β) > 0.9. The experimental protocol was approved prior to commencement by the local ethics 
committee (CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands). The methods were carried out in accordance with 
the relevant guidelines and regulations. All participants gave written informed consent and were either given finan-
cial compensation or credits towards completing a course requirement.
Experimental setup. Participants were seated at a table facing two vertically aligned computer screens 
(Fig. 1a). The top of the bottom screen (56 cm in size) was positioned at eye level of the communicator; the upper 
screen (same size) was suspended immediately above the bottom screen. Stimuli were visually presented on the 
two screens, just outside the communicator’s reaching distance, which depended on the participant’s arm length 
(52 to 57 cm from the participant to the bottom screen). An infrared position detection frame, the ‘IR-frame’ 
(TMDtouch iMac Zorro Macsk 55 cm, 16:9, USB connected), was used for online measurement of the position 
of the index finger. The frame spanned a detection plane in front of the bottom screen and within the commu-
nicator’s pointing range (13 cm from the home-key, and 17 cm in front of the bottom screen). Communicators 
sat in front of the frame, with their right index finger resting on a capacitive sensor (the home-key). A chin rest 
stabilized the head of the communicator and prevented eye contact with the other participants. The addressees/
onlookers were oriented towards the center of the screens, left and right at an angle of 40 degrees with respect 
to the communicator, each with their right hand resting on a keyboard button (the ‘addressee home-key’) and 
each with a mouse in front of them. At any point in time one of them was engaged in playing the game with the 
communicator (the addressee), whereas the other was not (the onlooker). A cardboard wall positioned at the top 
of the bottom screen prevented the eyesight of the addressee on the correct referent for that trial.
Experimental task. On each trial, three ‘sign’ tokens (colored squares of 4 × 4 cm, Fig. 1) were presented 
horizontally on the bottom screen for all three participants to see. Three ‘referent’ tokens, also visible to all three 
participants (Fig. 1a, also shown in the thought cloud of the addressee in Fig. 1b), were presented as two-color 
circle-triangle composites (4 cm in diameter) on the upper screen. To prevent the use of a communicative strat-
egy based on spatial congruency between the signs and referents, the referents were pseudo-randomly placed 
on three of nine possible locations of a 3 × 3 grid. At the onset of each trial, only the communicator was vis-
ually informed about the correct referent (Fig. 1a, also shown in the communicator’s thought cloud in Fig. 1b). 
All stimuli were presented against a black background. (Stimulus materials are available at: http://tinyurl.com/
OSF-PointingMatters).
The signs could be used to unequivocally identify the correct referent from a set of three through logical rules. 
Consider the stimuli in Fig. 1b as an example. The communicator is instructed that red-blue is the correct refer-
ent, out of the three referents seen by the addressee. He can influence the choice of the addressee by pointing to 
one of the three signs, i.e. the green, the blue or the red square. Pointing to the blue square would be most inform-
ative for the addressee since that sign can be unambiguously associated with the correct red-blue referent, given 
the colors of the other referents. Pointing to the red square would convey an ambiguous message because that 
sign can be associated with both the incorrect yellow-red and the correct red-blue referent. Lastly, the green sign 
can be associated with the incorrect green-magenta referent. These task features, adapted from well-established 
referential communication games48, promote pragmatic reasoning on the mapping between signs and referents. 
They were introduced to preserve the referential/inferential nature of communicative pointing and minimize 
participants’ reliance on stereotyped stimulus-response mappings. Accordingly, there was no consistent relation-
ship between the chosen colors of signs and referents, which were randomly selected from a set of six (red, blue, 
yellow, green, magenta and cyan). Furthermore, in 10% of the trials, only one of the colors in the correct referent 
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appeared in the set of signs. In principle, solving such a trial requires no disambiguation of sign-referent map-
pings, making the reasoning in the other 90% of the trials less stereotyped.
Experimental design. The experimental design included three factorial manipulations. First, the factor 
action (two levels: mind-oriented, object-oriented) manipulated how the addressee was provided with informa-
tion about the referent. In the mind-oriented condition, addressees were dependent on observing the pointing 
movement of the communicator towards one of the three signs in order to infer the correct referent. The commu-
nicator, knowing this dependency, needed to make a pointing movement that the addressee could use to make 
that inference. In contrast, in the object-oriented condition, the addressee did not need to make that inference, 
since he was visually informed about the identity of the referent. Second, the factor addressee (two levels: left, 
right) manipulated the role of the other two participants sitting next to the communicator. Across blocks of tri-
als, either the participant on the left or the right of the communicator took the role of addressee with whom the 
communicator was playing the game (always with the participant on the other side as the onlooker). Third, the 
factor sign (three levels: left, middle, right) varied with the location of the most informative (‘correct’) sign given 
the referents.
To influence participants through task contingencies rather than through verbal instructions, the game was 
embedded in a story. The joint goal of the participants was to open a highly secured vault by entering the correct 
sequence of colored referents. In the object-oriented condition, the computer system of the vault was working 
properly and the pointing movements were detected by the IR-frame. Hence, when the communicator pointed to 
a sign and returned to the home-key, the matched referent was displayed on the upper screen for the addressee to 
see. The addressee simply had to confirm this referent by selecting the identical token from the set of possibilities. 
Note that the IR-frame was actually used to detect – online – the pointing location and, therefore, the referent 
shown to the addressee always matched the sign that the communicator pointed to, according to the logical 
sign-referent mapping described above. This ensured that the pointing action had a direct instrumental conse-
quence, but also that the addressee could be presented with the wrong referent (if the communicator pointed to 
the wrong sign). In the mind-oriented condition, however, the electronic wiring of the vault was broken. In this 
condition, the addressee was required to infer the correct referent from the pointing movement of the communi-
cator towards one of the signs.
Note that the story provided a context for the two types of pointing movements. Three aspects of this context 
are relevant. First, the story emphasized the social nature of the tasks: by engaging in the task, the participants 
committed themselves to the joint goal of opening the vault together. Second, the story emphasized that the social 
nature of the task was similar across the two experimental conditions. Third, the story was used to drive the par-
ticipants towards making inferences on the communicative nature of the pointing movements. Namely, the story 
nudged the communicators towards the need to inform the addressee about their knowledge in two different 
ways, without using explicit verbal instructions. These three features of the task are emphasized by the story, but 
they do not depend on it. Note furthermore that the instrumental consequence of the pointing movement in the 
object-oriented condition only appeared after completion of the movement, which meant that the perceptual 
input before movement onset was identical across conditions and could not have driven biases in movement 
kinematics.
Experimental procedure. At the start of the experiment, communicators were familiarized with the exper-
imental setup and performed two practice sessions of the game. In the first practice session (8 trials), the partici-
pant that would be playing as communicator during the experiment adopted the role of addressee/onlooker. This 
training was introduced so that the communicator could experience the addressee’s visual perspective and task 
demands. In the second practice session (8 trials), the participant adopted the role of communicator. There were 
no constraints on the pointing movements, other than to move the index finger towards the screen, going through 
the 27.5 × 48.5 cm IR-frame, and return to the home-key.
The experiment consisted of three sessions of twenty minutes. There were 240 trials in total, grouped in 
blocks of ten trials with a short break in between. The correct-referent (and thereby the corresponding sign) 
was pseudo-randomly determined for each trial. The roles of addressee and onlooker changed every block. 
The mind-oriented and object-oriented actions changed every two blocks. Before each block, participants were 
informed of the forthcoming conditions, i.e. where the addressee/onlooker was located, and whether or not the 
vault-system was going to inform the addressee about the referent.
During a given trial all participants were required to have their fingers on their home-keys. At the start of a 
mind-oriented trial, the addressee (not the onlooker) triggered the presentation of signs and referents by pressing 
the space bar on their keyboard. In the object-oriented trials, similar inter-trial intervals were introduced by hav-
ing a computer presenting the stimuli after a random time interval (between 1.4 and 3.4 seconds). Once the com-
municator returned to the home-key after the pointing movement, a cursor appeared in between the referents on 
the upper screen. This allowed the addressee (not the onlooker) to control the cursor with a mouse, select one of 
the referents with a mouse-click and return to their home-key. Trial-by-trial feedback was given in the form of 
a thick red (incorrect) or green (correct) line surrounding the stimuli. Aggregate feedback on performance was 
provided at the end of each block (“Congratulations, you have successfully opened the vault” when all ten trials 
were correct; “Sorry, you were not successful in opening the vault” otherwise).
After completing all trials the participants were debriefed. Participants indicated that they were focused on 
solving the task successfully and they felt that their behavior was important for achieving that goal. Most of the 
communicators did not experience any differences in complexity between the mind-oriented and object-oriented 
pointing conditions while a couple of them indicated the mind-oriented condition to be more difficult because 
the addressee depended on seeing their movement. In line with this, only a few participants indicated that they 
explicitly considered the perspective of the addressee. Although it was obvious to all participants that their arm 
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movements were being recorded, they did not know which features of those movements were monitored or what 
the experimental expectations of them were.
Data-acquisition and analysis. The position and orientation of four sensors placed on the communicator’s 
right hand was sampled at 250 Hz (and 0.1 mm resolution) using an electromagnetic tracking system (LIBERTY, 
Polhemus). One sensor was placed on the distal phalanx of the index finger of the right hand just below the nail 
(index). Two sensors were placed on the hand, one on top of the second metacarpophalangeal joint (hand-radial) 
and the other on top of the fifth metacarpophalangeal joint (hand-ulnar). One sensor was positioned on the distal 
side of the corpus radii (wrist). As there were comparable results across the four sensors, we focused on the data 
obtained from the index-finger sensor. (Data is available at http://tinyurl.com/OSF-PointingMatters and tools for 
the analyses are available at https://github.com/lennartverhagen/kinemagic).
Kinematic data were analyzed using MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). A detailed specification 
of the data processing and analysis procedures can be found in57; here we provide a summary description. 
The time-series of positions/orientations of each sensor were low-pass filtered at 15 Hz using a sixth-order 
Butterworth filter.
Task phases. We considered the following task phases. The reaction time communicator was defined as the 
time from stimuli presentation to initiation of the movement (marked by the release of the home-key). The move-
ment time addressee was defined as the time from the release of the addressee’s home-key to selection of one of the 
referents. Within the movement phase of the communicator, several subcomponents were distinguished. We took 
particular care to robustly estimate their onsets and offsets by combining both distance and velocity parameters58. 
The forward movement time was defined as the time where the velocity of the index finger in the sagittal (yz) plane 
had increased and remained above 0.1 m/s while moving from the home-key to the end-point holding position. 
The holding time was defined as the time the end-point holding position was maintained, i.e. where the index fin-
ger remained at a velocity below 0.1 m/s, while in proximity of the signs. Lastly, the backward movement time was 
defined as the time where the velocity of the index finger in the sagittal (yz) plane had increased and remained 
again above 0.1 m/s, while moving from the end-point holding position back to the home-key. We ensured that 
all forward movements started in proximity of the home-key and ended in proximity of the signs. We included 
only movements that started no more than 10 cm above and 8 cm in front of the home-key and ended no more 
than 10 cm above, no more than 15 cm below and no more than 15 cm to the left or right of the signs. We used 
the same spatial restrictions to ensure that all backward movements started in proximity of the signs and ended 
in proximity of the home-key.
Kinematic parameters. We describe the pointing movements using the following kinematic parameters: 
trajectory length, peak velocity, and relative time-to-peak velocity (as a fraction of the forward movement time)59. 
Furthermore, we extracted and aggregated the spatio-temporal dynamics of the pointing trajectories as follows. 
First, for each trial, 100 samples along the forward movement trajectory were isolated at equally spaced time 
intervals using local spline interpolation. For each sample, we extracted the position along the x, y and z axis and 
calculated a signed numerical instantaneous derivative to describe the horizontal displacement (lateral, x-axis), 
depth (forward, y-axis) and altitude (height, z-axis). The spatial trajectory of the pointing movements was also 
used to quantify the end-point (in x, y and z) and trajectory variability. Additionally, we described the spatial 
movement variability as a function of progression along the trajectory. Aggregating trajectories, while ignoring 
temporal biases, is a non-trivial operation that involves iterative optimization60, 61. Our approach considered 300 
equidistant samples along the spatially averaged trajectory. At each sample we calculated the linear intersection 
of all individual trajectories with a plane perpendicular to the average instantaneous movement direction at that 
point in space. This resulted in series of 300 2D distributions of points (oriented in 3D). For each distribution 
the confidence ellipse was calculated on the basis of an Eigen-decomposition of the covariance matrix of this set 
of points and scaled using a χ2 distribution to match a 95% confidence interval in 2D62. The critical parameter 
describing the variability of the trajectories along the movement is the area of the confidence ellipses.
Statistical inference. We excluded the first two trials of the first block (0.8%) because we considered those 
to be prone to learning effects. Participants communicated effectively: on average 92.4% of the trials were solved 
correctly by both players. The remaining 7.6% of the trials were excluded from the analysis (the communicator 
pointed to a wrong sign, 1.9%, the addressee selected a wrong referent, 2.7%, or both participants selected the 
wrong token, 3.0%). Finally, we excluded trials where the reaction time of the communicator exceeded 8 seconds 
(0.6%) and outlier trials where any of the main kinematic parameters deviated from the first or third quartile 
by more than three interquartile ranges (4.7%). We also rejected trials where no valid movement was detected 
(2.1%), either because no movement was made, or the movement started away from the home-key (>10 cm 
above or >8 cm in front of the home-key), or the detected holding position was not in proximity of the signs 
(>10 above, >15 cm below, or >15 cm to the left or right of the signs). In total, 84.1% of all trials (per action: for 
mind-oriented 81.6% and object-oriented 86.4%, per addressee: left 84.6% and right 83.5%, per sign: left 80.3%, 
middle 85.2% and right 86.5%) survived the exclusion criteria and entered further analysis.
Statistical inference (of task phases, movement parameters and end-points) was drawn using the SPSS 16.0 
software package. Trials were averaged for each experimental condition, and the resulting means were entered 
into a univariate repeated-measures ANOVA testing for main and interaction effects between conditions within 
subjects. All parameters were normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). The statistical inference of the 
spatio-temporal dynamics is not possible by means of similar univariate or multivariate approaches, because 
of the inherent dependencies between data points neighboring in space and time. Therefore, we chose to use 
non-parametric cluster-based permutation statistics63. We obtained an accurate Monte Carlo estimate of the true 
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p-value (corrected for multiple comparisons) by comparing the cluster statistics of interest to the distribution of 
cluster statistics calculated from 10,000 random permutations of the conditions (using a critical alpha-level of 
0.05). With exception of the permutation statistics, all statistical tests were performed two-sided.
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